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[Page 213]

for 30 years the course of European politics - and the pacifistes are should be of that number - cannot be ignorant that two States should find themselves in that position - Austria & Germany.  For the first we do not hide it from ourselves, her heritage was long since divided before the death of the possessor.  Russia, Italy, Servia & Rumania divided between themselves the prey in advance, as for Germany they were the only ones to deny the danger in which she found herself, who did not wish to admit the fiasco, Anglo russian intrigues, intrigues which will be maintained tomorrow in history, & who only rejected the wrong notion upon which the principle argument rested.  It is perfectly comprehensible that Germany regarded all menace to Austria as a peril to her own security.  This last State (Germany) constituted for herself the rampart against the overwhelming "Panstave" as well as, during those ages (or centuries) it was the rampart of the Christian against the Turks.

It is these menaces of destruction which should be considered by the pacifistes, it is against them that we should make front and wrestle, following the principle which that it is expedient to attack not the effect but the cause of the disease, when we desire it to cure.  Of this they have well guarded themselves & we should be right today to reproach them if they had not done so, by their propanganda which is the play of those who went away, those menaces were the play of the present Entente, certainly there intentions were pure.  I can't believe but of these Hell is paved.

By holding ourselves to the principles formulated by Montesquieu we are able to say that even if Germany had provoked this war she had been in the right to do so, there should be no question of this, although for a long time she felt the danger, although she knew of the organised conspiracy against her, she did not attack even at times when certain of her adversaries would be disarmed or affable.  What occasion had she not to throw herself on the Russians loaded with heavy difficulties, external and internal, to march against disorganised France, in not taking advantage of them, waiting for them, for to enter into war, the moment where those enemies were attained

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