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[Page 52]

I wondered therefore, what course would be adopted and whether the Expedition would be withdrawn or abandoned before we committed ourselves still deeper into what might turn out to be a grand fiasco. I also wondered whether Sir Ian Hamilton would really face the true facts and let the Government know the real state of affairs. At this time we were barely holding on to the Peninsular and to enable us to do so, we had to keep all the battleships off the Coast, constantly bombarding the enemy's trenches, or resisiting his counter attacks. In addition an immense fleet of transports lay off the shore, and I could not help thinking what a magnificent chance was being missed by the enemy's submarines, and also what would happen to the Army if the submarines did appear, and thus force the Fleet and the transports to retire to Mudros. I learned that another Division the Lancashire Territorials, were due to arrive and might be expected any day. So it did not seem likely that any fresh advance would be attempted until they put in an appearance. In fact at this point the prospects of the Expedition looked particularly bad.

Monday May 3rd
This day I went on board the "Cornwallis" and called on Lawrence, whom I had not seen since we left Mudros. He told me of his experiences and of his many troubles with the censor, half of which are due to his lack of experience. He showed me several cables from Reuters in which it would appear that they are not altogether satisfied with his work, so I said that he could read through my despatches, if they would assist him in any way. I then returned to the "Implacable" after a short visit to the shore.

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