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[Page 168]

ask them to do any more. 'Why then' I replied 'Where they brought up and sacrificed once again in this fresh attack. To this he could only reply 'We had no other troops capable of making an attack and we thought we had a good chance of success having massed twentybfive thousand bayonets for this final attempt. It only proves' he went on 'that odds of three to one are not sufficient. This statement amazed me and I replied 'Who ever supposed they were after the lessons of this war' Why you want ten to one and a flank to make sure of any sort of victory when attacking an enemy entrenched up to his neck Dawny replied it so nearly succeeded and victory would have meant a Marquisate for Sir Ian'. This struck me as being a particularly low method of looking at the situation considering the deplorebale state in which the army and the country finds itself at the present time. I pointed out to Dawny that water fundamentally brought about the hold up or rather the lack of it.

He said that every detail had been most carefully worked out and that there was enough ashore to supply each man with a gallon'. I do not know what became of it for it certainly never reached the firing line. I asked him how Sir Ian felt. He replied we are all of coyrse very disappointed. I asked him about the future and he replied 'It is up to the Cabinet to decide what is to become of the expedition. The whole question has been submitted to them. They did not send us out reinforcements in time. We expected them in June not at the end of July. I asked him 'Why the Bulair landing had not been chosen. He replied '. We learnt that the Turks had five Divisions concentrated there to meet us and we would never even have got ashore. In the offical statement issued to us on the Minneapolis it was clearly stated that there

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