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[Page 217]

[Editor's note: Carbon copy of a report written by Ashmead Bartlett at Gallipoli, which appears to be addressed to the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. However it is not the version which was ultimately sent to Mr Asquith. See pages 237 and 245 and Ashmead Bartlett's diary, pages 178 and 193]

[Handwritten notes]
pencil notes on margin are "my Uncle Burdett-Coutt's"
[G?] Robertson 6/4/16
Original Copy will be sent, as per letter E A B

Review Of The Situation In Gallipoli.

It is not necessary to dwell on the initial error of attempting to force the Dardanelles with the Fleet alone, as that is now universally recognised. All our subsequent difficulties and the position in which the Allied Armies now stand are due to this cause. The Turks were given ample warning of our intentions and it was easy for them to judge that we had no intention of abandoning the campaign without making a great effort on land. It should have been obvious that the same brains which had shown so much skill in the defence of the Straits by sea would display just as much energy and determination in preparing the land defences.
But it cannot be maintained that our preparations for the land campaign were based on any such supposition or even on a reasonable estimate of the enemy's numbers or of the skill which the Germans would show in handling the Turkish armies in Gallipoli,. In spite of the lessons of March 18th we still persisted in underestimating our opponents and his powers of resistance. It does not seem to have been recognised after March 18th that the whole character of the campaign had fundamentally changed, namely, that the army was no longer an auxiliary of the Fleet but must take upon its shoulders the entire burden of clearing the Gallipoli Peninsula. After March 18th the Fleet had in fact become the

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