Item 02: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett articles on the Gallipoli campaign, 1915 - Page 71
attempted the possible too late, when it had unfortunately become an impossibility. Therefore, how can we get out of our present difficulties without loss of prestige? For the time being, the Fleet as an active factor in the operations must be eliminated altogether. Quite apart from the obstacles which are insurmountable right up to Gallipoli, the presence of submarines has rendered its position off the coast intolerable. We have already lost three capital ships and have little or nothing to show for it. If we are to eventually achieve our original objective, the task can only be accomplished by the army. The lighter vessels of the Fleet must still be utilised for bombarding the enemy's guns and keeping down the Asiatic batteries. Also the Fleet must dafeguard the seaway from Malta and the landing of supplies.
But if we are to achieve our original objective, namely, the taking of Constantinople by opening up the Narrows, the task can only be accomplished by the army. But not the army such as we have now. We want at least another five divisions. We cannot say we are in a position to clear the Dardanelles, to allow the Fleet to pass, until we have driven all the Turkish armies out of the Gallipoli Peninsula, north of the lines of Bulair into Thrace, where they can do us no more harm. Or else, we must bottle them up in Gallipoli by getting astride the Peninsula and cutting off their supplies. Such a movement with an entirely new army landed at Bulair or Enos would probably lead to decisive results, especially if a few more submarines of the latest type were sent to the Fleet to stop traffic from Asia to Europe. Once we get