Item 02: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett articles on the Gallipoli campaign, 1915 - Page 61
carry through successfully it would have required a far larger force than was then available and with the small force originally landed it might easily have ended in disaster.
On April 25th. the army was still regarded as the auxiliaiy of the navy, namely, to march parallel with it up the Peninsula, making good the positions as they were won. A compromise was adopted, that is to say, the Australians were landed at Anzac to make a diversion on the Turkish flank whilst the 29th Division was to seize the southern end of the Peninsula and work its way gradually up to the Narrows. It was decided that all the advantages which might be derived from the more ambitious programme must yield in importance to the immense moral and material support which this force would derive from having both its flanks protected by the Fleet which could thus bring a cross-fire to bear and rake the enemy's positions. Whether this decision was right or wrong, I am not prepared to argue. One thing is certain that the expectations formed of the Fleet's guns dismally failed to be realised and once more we have missed our objective.
The Effect Of The Ships' Guns.
Nothing has been more disappointing that the effect of these high-velocity, low-trajectory shells, both twelve and six inch, on the enemy's trenches and field workd. The Turks have proved themselves to be past-masters in digging themselves in. Time and time again our troops have been held up in their attacks by suddenly finding themselves up against deep trenches, the existence of which had not previously been suspected, hidden as