This page has already been transcribed. You can find new pages to transcribe here.


[Page 60]

The False Optimism.
Why were the Military Authorities confident they could carry the Achi Baba position and push on to the Narrows with such a small force after the lessons of Flanders, which have proved the immense power enjoyed by the defence in well fortified positions and the vast superiority in numbers necessary for an offensive if it is to be pushed home with any hope of success? I think the answer is to be found in the faith placed in the fire of ships' guns of large calibre on field works and their demoralising effect on the enemy's infantry. Otherwise, the position chosen for the disembarcation are extremely difficult of explanation.
By landing at the Southern extremity of the Peninsula the army was at once brought up against a series of positions of extreme natural strength, all of which would have to be taken by assault before Kilid Bahr on the European side of the Narrows, which was apparently the original objective of the army, could be reached. The whole movement would in fact consist of a series of costly frontal attacks on entrenchments. Whereas had an army been able to get astride the Peninsula at Bulair or Gaba Tepe and present an entrenched front both North and South, it is difficult to see how any food or ammunition could have reached the Turks, with our submarines active in the Dardanelles. At best, they could only have fed with extreme difficulty and in all probability they would have been starved into submission. This, of course, was strategically the big plan to undertake. But I am not attempting to criticise the Military Authorities for not adopting it. To

Current Status: