Item 02: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett articles on the Gallipoli campaign, 1915 - Page 160
fire of a number of ships may seem at first si ght, the material results are relatively small, which is clearly shown, not only from the failure of our attacks on the Narrows, but subsequently by the inability of naval guns to drive the Turkish infantry from their trenches.
Mr Churchill, of course, may claim that he based his opinion on Admiral de Robeck's cable which I have already quoted. But allowance must be made for the position and feelings of that gallant and determine fighter after the repulse of the 18th. He knew the wish of the Government to carry the affair through without delay and there was also the very natural desire to attempt to avenge the losses sustained and to prove to the enemy that a repulse is in no sense a defeat. But even this statement, that 'the Admiral after the attack on the 18th determined to renew it at the first opportunity and telegraphed accordingly', is qualified by another in the very same paragraph, like almost every other statement in this speech, which only serves to add to the general confusion. For Mr. Churchill says:
'It was determined to substitute for the purely naval operation a joint naval and military attack. I regretted this at the time, and endeavoured to persuade the First Lord to send a telegram, ordering a resumption of the naval attack. But we could not reach an agreement, and in view of the concensus of naval and military opinion on the spot. I submitted to the alternative of, but I submitted with great anxiety.'
The italics are mine. This passage shows that Mr. Churchill must have misunderstood the true purport of Admiral de Robeck's first cable after the fight, or else that the gallant Admiral, after more