Item 02: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett articles on the Gallipoli campaign, 1915 - Page 151
attempt to take a Fleet through three lines of mines, right under the fire of a hundred guns, many of heavy calibre, without running the risk of incurring the greatest Naval disaster in the history of this, or any other country.
But in spite of the shadows which were now settling deeply over the whole enterprise, Mr. Churchill in the same paragraph as the last one I have quoted continues as follows:
'It was therefore decided that the gradual advance must be replaced by more vigorous measures. Admiral Carden was Invited to press hard for a decision, and not to be deterred by the inevitable loss.'
Now it is obvious from this statement that the experts had changed their opinion or else that Mr. Churchill had succeeded in changing the opinion of the experts. Because in the early part of his speech he makes the following statement in reference to his telegram to Admiral Carden, putting to him this specific question:
'Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable operation? The Admiral replied to the effect that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, but could be reduced by a regular and sustained naval bombardment. I put the same question simultaneously to Sir Henry Jackson, the present First Sea Lord, and received from him an almost similar answer.
'The coincidence of opinion between these two officers, both of the highest attainments and so differently ciroumstanced, one on the spot, the other the expert at the Admiralty who was studying the Eastern theatre with the War Staff - the coincidence of opinion between those two made a profound impression on my mind.'
The French Naval Staff must also have changed their minds at this stage, or else were won over or not consulted at all, because Mr.