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[Page 13]
"Through the HINDENBURG Line"
From the 8th August onwards the Australian Corps, working with the remainder of the 4th Army, had continuously and untiringly pushed the German forces Eastwards. There had been several determined attempts on the part of the enemy to hold his ground, but each time a resolute attack, carefully but quickly arranged, had been the means of severely beating the divisions then holding the line, causing the German commanders to withdraw still further and to postpone once again their effort to stem our victorious advance. One of the most desperate attempts of this nature was the stand made on the "Water line" of the SOMME. To PERRONE the SOMME Canal and river runs almost due North and then turns West towards AMIENS. Up to 29th August the advance had been made along both the Northern and Southern banks of this river. The enemy withdrew behind the natural obstacle afforded by the sudden bend to the South, destroying all bridges before he evacuated the Western bank, and strongly reinforced the exposed Northern flank in the vicinity of MONT ST QUENTIN and the dry canal of the CANAL du NORD. By the united efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions and in one of the most remarkable operations of 1918, this flank was turned and the Hun forces had once again to retreat.
From the information available, based on previous knowledge of the country and air reports, it was evident that in all probability his next stand would be made on the ST QUENTIN CANAL or HINDENBURG System, as the country between that line and the SOMME nowhere offered any marked facilities for defence, being for the most part the country he had devastated in his former retreat of early 1917.
By 20th September, after a series of advanced guard actions and local attacks, we for the most part held our old line of early 1918 and, in places, a footing had been gained in the outpost positions to the main HINDENBURG Line. The enemy resistance and the increase in the weight of his artillery made it clear that only an organised attack could hope to penetrate the defence to any depth. The fact that we held certain information concerning the defence scheme of the SIEGFRIED System (that part of the line North of ST QUENTIN), combined with the lowered morale of the enemy troops and their probable unfamiliarity with the sector, made the success of a determined attack highly probable. Against these factors however, there was, firstly, the strength of the position with its natural obstacle - the ST QUENTIN CANAL - strengthened by very thick bands of wire; and, secondly, the great faith placed in the impregnability of the line by all German troops.
The part allotted to the Australian Corps was to make a breach in the 6,000 yards of line in front of where the Canal ran through the BELLICOURT Tunnel. To assist in this purpose two American Divisions were attached to the Corps for the period of the operation. The general plan, as finally drawn up, was for the two American Divisions to break the main line by a "set piece" attack under cover of a heavy barrage and preceded by a period of artillery bombardment. This necessitated a minor operation by the 27th American Division to capture a part of the proposed jumping-off line then held by the enemy. The success gained was to be exploited by the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions, assisted by Whippet Tanks, but without any artillery support beyond that from certain mobile sections attached to the brigades. The 4th Australian Division was to be held in readiness to exploit still further should the situation develop favourably.