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[Page 10]
Remarks on the Operation
1. The part allotted to the Third Division was to exploit a successful attack by the 27th Division. While it was expected that the latter would have heavy casualties, it was not thought possible that the exploiting division would have to carry the Start Line or the First Objective. The part played by the Third Division was therefore an improvised attack on a very strong defence position, hampered by the presence of isolated parties of the original attack, and therefore limiting the employment of our artillery and machine gun fire to support our infantry.
Put in plain language, the Third Division had to fight in the zone of attack of the 27th. without a barrage or any advantage of numbers, light, surprise, etc.,
2. The difficult American task of starting at such a distance from the Artillery Start Line was further hampered by their shortage of officers and consequent loss of control. Well over 1,000 stragglers from the Division attached themselves to Third Divisional units and did excellent service but hardly one officer could be found. Their casualties were extraordinarily heavy in front of the BROWN Line.
3. The formal attack of the 10th. and 11th. Brigades at 3.0 p.m. on the 29th was undoubtedly of value in driving the enemy advanced posts from commanding ground, and securing our left flank against counter-attack from the North. The numbers available, the preparations possible, and the artillery limitations, however, negatived any chance of carrying the HINDENBURG Line.
4. It is impossible to assign any value to the action of the Tanks or Armoured Cars on the left sector of the attack. Their fate was soon settled by anti-tank defence or mine-field.
5. Information during the 29th and 30th was singularly conflicting; "flares near Gouy" and "on RED Line" were reported by the air service, and BONY, though strongly held by the enemy, was confidently reported to be in American hands. Whether these reports were fact or not at the time, it was abundantly clear to observers that the enemy intended to hold his ground and regain what he had lost locally. As to his ability to carry out his intentions, the volume of his infantry, machine gun and artillery fire, no less than the casualties he was able to inflict on the American and Australian Divisions, showed that it was by no means a matter of machine gun posts.
6. The attack of the 11th. Brigade Northwards along the HINDENBURG Line on the 30th. took the unwelcome form of a continuous bombing attack in which the advantage lay with the defence.. This was forced on the troops as