Primary tabs
Transcription
[Page 1]
M E M O R A N D U M
RELATIVE TO
N A V A L S I G N A L S.
THE superiority of our Navy to that of every other Maritime Power is universally allowed - and it is glorious for the Nation, that we can justly boast of having more generally improved in the Arts of Navigation and Naval Architecture, and of possessing the compleatest Ships, with the ablest Officers and Seamen, which imply our greater liberality, encouragement, and application. But it is, at the same time, a grievous and glaring truth, that these inestimable advantages are heavily clogged, or nearly lost to us, because we do not also possess the means of employing them with full effect. The means we want, are sufficient Signals - this highly important branch of Naval Science having been neglected to such a degree, that our present systems are, if not the worst existing, extremely defective and insufficient, while those of our enemies, who have been more provident in this respect, are far superior, which enables them to act against us with more confidence than they otherwise would.
It is evident that in the Navy, as well as the Army, much depends on the experience and professional skill of the Commanders ; without these, a mere superiority of numbers, whether in Ships or Men, will not always secure the object for which it contends. And it must equally be allowed, that the talents of the ablest Naval Commander, cannot be duly exerted and manifested, if he has not ready and distinct means to signify his orders and directions, under all possible circumstances, to every Squadron, and to every particular Ship in his Fleet.
That our Naval Commanders labour under this alarming disadvantage, has been seen and felt, on a variety of occasions, in service - it is confirmed by the representations that have been made, and the daily complaints to be heard, on this subject - and will be more generally understood by the following statement :
In our established Systems of Signals, Flag Ships, and Private Ships too, are encumbered with a large number of Flags and Pendants, for making a very limited number of Signals. Several of these Signals occasionally become useless, from their being restricted to fixed situations, or are liable to be mistaken on account of their colour ; while others, being made by an union of Pendants with Flags, are consequently, not to be distinguished, unless at a very moderate distance, such as the smallest of the two objects displayed, requires and determines.
To direct each individual Ship in our Fleets, the Commanders have no other means than Pendants - these are most commonly restricted to certain Mast Heads and Yard Arms, and to be distinguished, as before observed, the Ships they concern must not be distant. Were a Commander in Chief to lose one of his Masts in action, it would be wholly out of his power to direct, when, perhaps his certain victory was depending on it, those Ships whose Signals were restricted to that Mast and its Yards ; and such an accident, although liable to happen from other causes also, not being fully and constantly provided against, might occasion a defeat so much the more mortifying to the nation ; for double Pendants, which were devised to supply the defects of single ones in such cases, are not always adopted ; and, were they even permanently established, would, nevertheless, be ineffectual, because, in certain lights and dispositions of the air, as well as in a smoke, they are not distinguishable, where Flags would be plainly seen.
The Night and Fog Systems are more exceptionable in all respects, being still less comprehensive, and more defective. They do not contain any means whatever, for signifying the orders and directions that may be requisite to any Squadron or Ship exclusively - all their Signals being general, and the greater part of the Night Signals so indistinct, as to endanger the common safety; because, in many cases, it is not only possible, but likely, that some of them appearing in different form at the same instant, to Ships happening to be in different positions around, a confusion may ensue, totally subversive of the Commander's views and projects.
In