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[Page 20]
14. DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
The normal location of Divisional Headquarters for offensive warfare is too far back for the most effective carrying out an attack of this nature, as in the event of any interruption of communications, the Divisional Headquarters staff is quite in the dark for a considerable length of time, generally until a reconnaissance or visit to the unit has been made by a staff officer, which takes a considerable period of time.
Further, the advance of the troops lengthens the distance by adding on an Area of more or less doubtful communication. Change of location of Headquarters during an operation is also undesirable. Divisional Headquarters, therefore, must either remain well in the rear till the conclusion of the Operation, or move forward during the time that consolidation is going on.
The alteration of telephone communication and connections takes a considerable time, and it is considered that this can best be done before the operation, enabling at least the fighting portion of Divisional Headquarters staff to be established at a forward Battle Headquarters prior to ZERO.
15. BRIGADE & BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.
Similarly, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters must be situated well forward prior to ZERO hour.
Though Battalion Headquarters must remain more or less stationary, the Battalion Commander must not be tied to this locality as in trench to trench attacks.
Horses of Mounted officers must be maintained well forward, and used as the opposition, weakens, and the conditions approach those of open Warfare.
The personal reconnaissance of Mounted Officers, and the ability of the Commanding Officer to rapidly move from place to place, to personally supervise the fighting, is a tactical necessity.
16. TRANSPORT.
The country being open, with very little wire, transport was able to work well up behind the infantry. Packs were arranged and used, but wheeled transport was generally used after the first journey.
17. ENEMY ARMS.
The use by our troops of enemy rifles and machine guns saved much of our ammunition, and obviated the necessity of much carrying, the machine guns considerably augmenting the fire power of consolidating Units.
The use of captured field guns against the enemy, if it did nothing else, had a great moral effect on the spirits of our troops.
18. FOUR-LETTER CODES.
The change of normal Code Names and Code Calls prior to an operation is not considered sound, as new names are unfamiliar to all Units and, in the event of a message from a neighboring Unit being received by an officer in the Forward Area who has not a list of such code names in his possession, the message is comparatively worthless.
The possibility of enemy Listening Sets detecting the change of Calls prior to ZERO, and thereby suspecting either relief or possibly attack, and opening artillery counter-preparation (at a time when such action would seriously hamper the Approach March and Assembly) is considered far greater than the possibility of a dazed enemy again setting up Listening Apparatus during the progress of such an attack.
[signed] J. Gellibrand
Major-General.
Commanding Third Aust. Divn.
4th September, 1918