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13. At this stage Lieut.-Colonel E.K. KNIGHT was killed by a shell from an anti-tank gun. The machine gun fire increased when the tanks again commenced to move and continued to cause casualties, compelling the infantry to keep down.
14. Considering surprise in the initial stages essential to the success of the operation and being out of [word omitted] communication with Divisional Headquarters, General McNICOLL decided that the operation, as planned, could not be carried out. He thereupon ordered the 38th. and 40th. Battalions to form a line facing North-East running from the road about R.27.d.0.4 to R.26.a.1.5 (approx) and the 37th and 39th. Battalions to withdraw to the old trench system near R.30.d.
15. A report was received at Divisional Headquarters at 11.20 p.m. stating "that the enemy commenced a heavy barrage on main VILLERS - BRETONNEUX Road near LA FLAQUE at 10 p.m. and it was still continuing at 10.35 p.m. and one at 11.35 p.m. reporting that enemy aeroplanes dropped 50 bombs at 9.50 p.m. near Brigade H.Q. causing casualties to man and horses, and that tail of column passed LA FLAQUE at 11.10 p.m."
The cable wagon had difficulty in getting the line through to 10th Inf. Brigade H.Q. which was not yet connected by telephone, but only by wireless and D.R.
16. At 12.10 a.m. a message sent by wireless was received from the Brigade saying that Lieut.-Colonel KNIGHT was dangerously wounded and asking for Major STORY (who was liaison officer with Second Australian Division) to be sent forward to take command. This was arranged.
17. At 12.30 a.m. the telephone line was through and the first information received from Brigade Headquarters as to the actual situation. I spoke to G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Brigade and ascertained that the head of the column was held up, the tanks returning and that the 37th. Battalion had suffered severely. The line was cut by enemy bombs or artillery before full details could be obtained.
18. As all efforts to get in touch again by telephone failed, an order was sent by D.R. at 1.40 a.m. to 10th. Inf. Brigade in the following terms - "Consequent on telephone report to G.O.C. at 12.13 a.m. In the event of being unable to carry out the operation as previously ordered, co-operate with 9th. Inf. Brigade in taking up a position from cross-roads at R.27.d.4.5. round to Eastern side of PROYART Village to vicinity of R.13.central aaa Report as early as possible as to action taken aaa A full report on sequence of events since 9.30 p.m. last night particularly concerning the action of tanks and protective arrangements will be forwarded to Divisional Headquarters by returning D.R. aaa Telephone communication has been broken since 12.30 a.m." This was addressed to 10th. Inf. Brigade and repeated to 9th. Inf. Brigade and Second and Fourth Australian Divisions.
19. At 3.15 a.m. the line was again through to the Brigade, and G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Brigade reported that the order mentioned in para.20 had not yet reached him, that he was withdrawing the 37th and 39th Battalions to the old AMIENS Line, and had ordered the 38th. and 40th. Battalions to take up a line from about R.27.d.2.4. to join the present front line somewhere near R.25.b. on about a 1,000 yards front. Instructions were given for the 10th. Inf. Brigade to join with the 9th. Inf. Brigade on road running diagonally from R.27.d. and in co-operation with 9th. Inf. Brigade to send out patrols towards PROYART and if unocoupied work out in front of it.
P.T.O.