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[Page 47]
It was only a small part of the work they carried out in connection with these operations. For some months before the curtain actually rose they were engaged upon the work, the efficient performance of which had a vital bearing upon the ultimate result of our scheme of action. The months of July and August were an extremely busy period for all branches of our Force. All the vast preparations necessary for a big attack were in progress immediately behind our line, and it was obviously of paramount importance that the enemy should be kept as much in the dark as possible as to what was going on there. This was successfully accomplished, owing chiefly to the efforts of the Air Force. Referring to this matter, General Allenby, in his despatch on the operations says:- 'That the enemy expected an offensive on my part about this date is probable. That he remained in ignorance of any intention to attack in the coastal plain with overwhelming numbers is certain.' While the concentration in the coastal plain was being carried out, every precaution possible to prevent any increased movement becoming apparent to the Turk was taken. Full use was made of the groves around RANLEH, LUDD and JAFFA to conceal troops during the day, but, says the Commander-in chief 'the chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, however, to the supremacy in the air which had been obtained. The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going all through the summer. During one week in June, 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to 18. In the next few days a number were shot down with the result that only 4 ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.' For several days prior to the commencement not a single enemy machine got over our line.
When any enemy aircraft did venture over our line during this period, it was invariably on the 'tip and run' principle, and they were usually pursued home, though not always overtaken. Moreover, they came over at altitudes from which accurate ov[b]servation was impossible, generally from 16,000 to 18,000 feet. In compiling a report on a reconnaissance made from this height, the observer would need to rely more upon his imagination than any other faculty. The value of the information they handed in on these occasions may be gathered from the following extracts from those reports appearing in the German Flying Corps Diary, referring to observations taken of movements and dispositions of our forces from 1st to 16th September – 'The total camp capacity of the enemy had remained as before! 'only unimportant regrouping of troops without change of strength'. These refer to the
period when the greatest concentration carried out during the whole campaign was in progress.
The parlous state to which the German Flying Service had been reduced at this stage, as an outcome of the unceasing aggressiveness and enterprise of our pilots, is also reflected in this diary. Under date of August 31st it is recorded that owing to the
activity of the Bristol Fighters far behind the enemy's lines, the short distance reconnaissance work of the enemy machines had been rendered 'extraordinarily difficult' . It is complained that the Bristol Fighters were continually over their aerodrome, while on the 27th the men's tents on the aerodrom[e] at JENIN were attacked with machine gun fire. It is further stated that 'the loss of two machines of 301 Squadron compelled the suspension of all flying of other machines in front of the VIIIth Army. The carrying on of flights on the rest of the front will be attempted to be maintained occasionally.' According to enemy records, this shortage of machines was soon overcome by the arrival of 'replacements' at the front; but it seems that the pilots necessary to fly them were not forthcoming. Frequent reference is made to the scarcity of pilots 'owing to sickness and other causes', while under date of September 15th four days before the commencement of our offensive, the following entry appears:- 'Owing to the extraordinary lack of pilots, limited flying only can be carried our [out] in spite of the arrival of 20 new "D.F.W. 's"
In view of the achievements of our airmen, it is not surprising to find this official intimation of the unpopularity of the enemy service. During the eight weeks immediately proceeding the date upon which our attack was launched, members of this Squadron destroyed 15 enemy machines and drove down 27 others.