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[Page 18]   
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Pooling of Engineers & Pioneers.
The Corps Pool of Engineers and Pioneers left the Division with the equivalent of 3 Engineer or Pioneer Companies belonging to different Units - 2 from another Division. If considered necessary to pool Engineers and Pioneers for future Operations, it is recommended that instead of taking away such a complete organisation as a Pioneer Battalion from a Division, and replacing it by portion of similar personnel from other Divisions, that each Division be called upon to supply a quota of such technical personnel, leaving the normal Headquarters and the bulk of the personnel with their own Divisions.
As the Units composing the Corps pool were allotted special tasks under their own Commanders some days prior to the Operation, the necessity of taking complete Units from Division is not apparent.

6.   ISSUE OF ORDERS.

Except for the issue of a preliminary order, and instructions, the majority of Divisional instructions were conveyed personally to Commanders by means of Conferences, and visits of the Staff. The result obtained is considered due in many ways to these Conferences, where points were discussed and decided, difficulties or uncertainties brought to notice, and the whole Plan of Operations made known to all Officers present..

7.   WEATHER CONDITIONS.

The weather conditions during the preparations were generally favourable, being dull with occasional heavy showers, without which movement on roads must have been noticed by the enemy. The state of the ground, however, was so sodden that without the 24 hours dry period prior to the attack, the progress of Infantry and Tanks at the rate required would have been doubtful. On the day of the Attack weather conditions were in every way suitable.

8.   PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE.

The previous reconnaissance of forward areas by the additional Artillery and Infantry was carefully organised, only parties of 3 or under being allowed, and all parties being ordered to report at Forward Brigade Headquarters. This enabled supervision to be exercised and visits to Special O.Ps. regulated to prevent crowding.

9.   APPROACH MARCH.

The night of the 7th/8th August was exceptionally favourable for the Approach March, being dark, but clear, enabling our aeroplanes to fly over the enemy lines to hide the noise of the Tanks. Despite the large number of Infantry, guns and tanks moving forward in the Area, no hitch or delay was occasioned during the Approach March.
The importance of clearly marking approach tracks was evident. All tracks were marked with Posts about 4 ft. high with a square white board, several days previously. Early on "Y" night more posts were inserted at an average distance of about 200 yards apart. At any place where doubt was likely to arise, tapes were laid between the Posts. The marking of these tracks was continued into the captured territory on "A" day, after the Infantry advance, and has been of great value for fresh troops, reserves, runners, ration and transport parties.
Short lengths of tape perpendicular to the Jumping Off tape were also found extremely useful, both for assisting the Assembly and for giving direction when jumping off.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            P.T.O.

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