[Page 60]
as soon as strong enemy forces are being concentrated West of the Jordan or at the Bridgehead.
7. I recommend alternative positions being prepared for the artillery, and more use made of Dummy positions.
This will lessen our losses.
(Signed) LIMAN VON SANDERS.
(Apparently draft for telegram).
4th May, 1918.
To Major Von Papen,
During the night 3rd Cavalry Division took the heights North of Es Salt, and it is now in immediate possession.
The enemy has retired in a S.W. direction, and is being pursued by a Battalion and some Cavalry moving on a parallel course.
I hold you personally responsible if, through any delay on the part of Shukri Bey's Column, a set back should occur.
I request an immediate report from the scene of fighting.
(Signed) LIMAN VON SANDERS.
N.B. - (1) Liman Von Sanders evidently estimated each Cavalry Brigade at two Regiments.
(2) Close to Ain Hamman, 3 miles S.W. of Amman.
The draft letter below is undated, but from contemporary correspondence is undoubtedly of about 5th May, 1918.
Marshal Liman. Nablus.
Now that the normal situation is restored I respectfully notify your Excellency of the following:-
1. The Army most emphatically protests against the untrue announcement of the 7th Army, that the 3rd Cavalry Division took the heights North of Es Salt.
These heights are covered with the dead of the 66th Infantry Regiment, only one patrol from the 8th Cavalry Regiment was there just as strange is the assertion of the 3rd Cavalry Division, that for two days past they have been in possession of the Western heights, as yesterday evening the English Cavalry entirely unhindered withdrew beyond Es Salt in the direction of El Mandesi.
The 66th Infantry Regiment fought very gallantly. Its high losses prove this. If they did not succeed in beating the enemy at the exact moment desired by your Excellency, this was due to circumstances into which I cannot enter in a "Clear" telegram.
However, your Excellency will doubtless agree that when an attack repeatedly ordered does not develop, I should as in duty bound report with regard to the situation as it actually is, and should not make triumphant announcements.
Your Excellency will be satisfied with the bearing of the 8th Army Corps; which during the foregoing weeks has been so equipped and furnished with directions from the Army, that no doubt could prevail as to its task.
2. Your Excellency has complained of deficient reports. In reply to this I respectfully report that the Army Headquarters only had one Telephone Operator at its disposal. The rest of the personnel took part in the defence of Es Salt, and are dead, wounded or prisoners - besides this Headquarters had only one line, generally out of order, which served at the same time as Operation line. Your Excellency will agree that this line, when in working order should be used first of all for the transmission of Operation Orders. I may add that I had only one Orderly Officer. All other Officers, despite urgent requests were unable to keep up with the Headquarters as they were not mounted.
The Army Headquarters working under such conditions has been for five days continuously in closest touch with its units. It left Es Salt one minute before the English forced their way in.
It is evident, that the limited communications of the Army Headquarters might give the impression that it was not informed as to the situation during this period. In the same way as a Headquarters established in Nablus, with a great number of good lines. As a matter of fact, the Headquarters were always well informed as to the situation.