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Then again, dealing with a pursuing force, as we were in the Beersheba-Jerusalem operations in 1917, and the Damascus operations in 1918. There are numerous cases in these operations where the sword would have been, or was, invaluable. Take the operations about Huj in November, 1917. With my late experience I can see what we could have done with the sword there. We were in touch with large bodies of the enemy somewhat disorganised, retreating, but still armed. We had no swords and could only deal with them by fire action. Their line was too broad to outflank. The Regiments engaged them at a distance and where practicable raced in and cut out guns and transport. They inflicted casualties and took prisoners but did nothing really big. If they had had swords I am now confident from my late experiences that they would have made wholesale captures. It is not reasonable to expect mounted riflemen to charge positions mounted. It is only bluff, and if the enemy stood to it the charge could end in failure only. Such bluffs, I know, have come off, but we cannot alwys expect to be lucky. For instance the 4th A.L.H. Brigade at Beersheba. At Katia, in August, 1916, my regiment, the 5th Light Horse Regiment, charged the Katia Oasis, mounted, with bayonets on rifles, as lances, in two lines, two squadrons in first line, one in second. The rifle under such conditions is very unhandy. In this case there were only a few enemy there when we arrived. At the first Gaza - 27th March, 1917 - the same Regiment, gallopped the cactus hedges at the rear of Gaza, the men firing their rifles from their horses - the mere appearance of the horsemen mong the Turkish battalion holding that sector was quite enough. The fire from the horses was not, of course, very effective - swords would have been of the greatest value there.
Now dealing with cases in the recent operations. As the Brigade approached Jenin on the afternoon of 20th September, a party of 1,800 of the enemy were observed on our right front. They were promptly charged with drawn swords and surrendered. If we had had no swords the procedure would have been a careful approach, then probably a fire fight and we could not have got into Jenin that night. Probably the 6,000 extra prisoners that we got would have evaded us, or had time to organise.
Later on the same evening our men galloping up the streets of Jenin demoralised the enemy much more quickly than a dismounted approach with fire would have done. The quickness of it meant practically no casualties to us.
Take the example of the 2nd October north of Damascus where the galloping approach of a Regiment with flashing swords caused the prompt surrender of a whole column of nearly 1500 men, well supplied with machine guns and guns, and who were not taken by surprise, and had been putting up a defence for the last hour. I am confident that if swords had not been in evidence that morning, it would have happened that the leading Regiment would have taken up a position on the flank of the column and opened fire upon them. The enemy would have continued the fire fight with their numerous machine guns and artillery, all the time moving to the pass. Half an hour's respite would have enabled them to get there, once there they were safe. We might have inflicted 50 or 100 casualties on them and would have suffered a good few ourselves. The rushing horses and the swords settled it, we had one casualty, they were all casualties.
I do not wish for a moment to say that swords can be used on all occasions, but I do contend that the mere possession of the weapon which he can use while on his horse instills in a man a spirit of the offensive, and that there are occasions, and many of them, where the sword is by far the most effective weapon and then chiefly by its moral effect. It is the duty of the trained leader of mounted men to know when to use the rifle and when the sword.
L.C. WILSON, Brigadier-General.