Primary tabs
Transcription
[Page 62]
again as soon as possible. This could, however, according to views taken here, only come to pass through a co-operation of forces from the direction of Ed Damie and Amman.
The task of the VIII Army Corps was clear. It had to hold on. In consequence of this, the only thing the Army Command could do was to exercise as much influence as possible on the battle front which was developing round Es Salt. Hence the decision to take to the heights to the North of Es Salt, which had already been discussed before, when your Excellency was present.
Had the Army Command joined up with the 8th Corps Commander, then it would have been cut off from every communication and not even in the position to provide for the reinforcements of the VIII Army Corps.
2. The Marshal reproaches the Army for not taking the flank position recommended by him since the beginning of April. If the 48th Division had been situated on a flank position on the Jordan, the rapid break through of the enemy cavalry towards the North would of course have been prevented. I however venture to leave it at the judgement of your Excellency whether the Lufty Division with three Battalions (not yet 1000 strong) would have been in the position to hold the front attack by the 60th Infantry Divisioin; on the other hand I venture to remind your Excellency that the Army has four times requested that the 2nd Caucusus Brigade be placed under it for tactical purposes. This request was rejected. The result was that the 9th Cavalry Regiment immediately withdrew before the enemy cavalry to Mafid Jozele, whilst the 11th Cavalry Regiment obstructed the right flank of the 48th Division; if the 2nd Caucusus Brigade had been attached, it would have been withdrawn into the Mountain passes leading to Salt, and would have delayed the enemy until the weak local defences of Salt could have been strengthened.
3. The Marshal considers that not too much be said in such a position, of losses and scarcity of water. The attack of the 66th Infantry Regiment had come to a complete standstill at noon on the 3rd May and encountered energetic resistance. The infantry lay on the whole 100 to 200 meters in front of the enemy. Then the telegram from the Marshal arrived that Salt musts be taken on that very afternoon. I reported as in duty bound, how things stood and said that it was not possible to continue the attack before night set in - at the same time however, as the action of the enemy seemed to be with regard to the whole position to be threatening, I requested that the pressure on Salt be continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division.
It of course goes without saying that all the difficulties mentioned in the report such as munition supply, and provision of water, have been surmounted, and that we continue the attack with the utmost energy. The Marshal must not therefore construe a faithful report as lack of energy on the part of those beneath him. I have certainly been in a more difficult situation in war than this, but never yet has this reproach been made to me.
Your Excellency will understand that with such differences of opinion, confidential and profitable work is not possible.
An Army Command can demand that tactical decisions which can only be formed on the basis of a judgement made on the spot should not be characterised without further ceremony as entirely unreasonable.
I therefore think it best for all parties if his Excellency the Marshal, responds to the wish I directed to him. I further report briefly to your Excellency on the position here.
It is not improbable that the enemy will shortly make a renewed attempt to capture the East Jordan region.
Considering the importance of an English success in the East Jordan region to the general position of the Army Group, the Army feels bound in duty to make the following proposals:-
A fresh attack may be attempted, with the numerous British Cavalry, by encircling both flanks of the VIII Army Corps (especially the left) with a simultaneous holding down of the front of the Army Corps and the breakthrough of a Cavalry Division East of Jordan towards the North.
The communication in rear of VIII Army Corps must in all circumstances be kept open.