Item 14: George Washington Thomas Lambert papers, October 1917-March 1919 - Page 59

[Page 59]

APPENDIX "G"

Correspondence between Field Marshall Liman Von Sanders, Major Von Papen, Chief of Staff, IVth Turkish Army, and Djemal Pasha, Commander of IV Army.

4/5/18

His Honour,
Major Von Papen,
     I regret to have to inform your Honour that I am not in any way in agreement with the various measures recently adopted by the Chief Command of the IV Army.
     The VIII Army Corps fought well and bravely under Ali Euad Bey, and but for this results would have been very different.
     I give my criticism below:-

1. It would have been advisable for the Headquarters of the IV Army to keep in close touch with the VIII Army Corps when a serious attack was to be delivered.  I cannot in any way approve of its move Northwards.
2. The whole of the enemy operations were directed against Es Salt.  The enemy wishes to create a strategical bridgehead, whence he can advance later against Amman, Deraa, or Beisan;  consequently it is necessary to retake Es Salt at all costs.
   This would be difficult by day as the enemy has so many Machine Guns with his Cavalry, but at night it would always be possible from the North, with Infantry, as the enemy has there only two Cavalry Brigades (1), and later on, indeed, a fifth regiment, besides some artillery.
   Only on the North is co-operation possible with the 3rd Cavalry Division, which has fought splendidly.
   I recommend pushing forward a light screen of Infantry on to the former battle ground at the first sign of the light failing;  with this, at dusk, artillery and Machine Guns should come into action.
   The remainder of the Infantry should be collected on the right wing, and should take Es Salt with the bayonet from the North.
   Instead of that, in this morning's report, there appears a statement that the right wing of the Infantry is advancing on Es Salt and that the 8th Cavalry Regiment is already there.
3. I would suggest that in such a position there should not be so much talk of losses and shortage of water.  In severe fighting of this kind, losses are inevitable.  Water could be brought from Suweileh.
   Other troops have had far greater losses.  It is we, as Prussian Officers, who are charged with the duty of pushing forward with the greatest energy, satisfying complaints as far as possible, but otherwise insisting with an iron-like resolution on our wishes.
4. Had the VIII Army Corps taken up the flanking position which I have advised since the beginning of April, such a break through by Cavalry would never have occurred.  Water can be no excuse, for there is sufficient in the Jordan, and the men's supplies could have been boiled.
5. I recommend, in the VIII Army Corps' position, to give each cavalry post that has been pushed out, a group of infantry with a Machine gun;  these can later be protected by barbed wire.  Perhaps this cannot take place everywhere, but it must be done on the most important roads.
6. I have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that it is necessary to close the important roads at suitable places, or at least prepare them for closing.  But on 30th April, at 7.30 a.m. the English were at Jisr Ed Damie with artillery and motors, and shortly before 11 a.m. a few squadrons had arrived opposite Es Salt. I am going to send Major Effuert to Es Salt to arrange a few supporting points on decisive heights, the early completion of which I request, is possible with the help of the inhabitants.
   I beg that the above named work may be taken in hand as soon as possible on the roads leading to Es Salt, as well as on the roads leading to Tell Hammam (2).  The barricades can be watched during the day by patrols, in order not to employ too many groups.  At night they must be manned, also