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[Page 44]
Field Troop were pushed on ahead to collect material and repair the bridges. Our orders were to reach the high ground overlooking Kuneitra before dark. At 0930 while on the march a message was received from advanced squadron, 9th L.H. Regiment that the enemy were holding Yakub and the Jordan crossings with machine guns and at least one field gun, and were entrenching. Aeroplane reconnaissance confirmed this - the total enemy force being estimated at 600-800. The Division halted at Rosh Pina, the balance of the 9th L.H. Regiment with Notts Battery, R.H.A. being sent on to clear up the situation. It soon became apparent that the enemy were determined to vigorously dispute the crossing of the river. Lt. Hannaford reported a crossing not held by the enemy about 2 miles south of the bridge, at El Min. The enemy no doubt recognised that every hour he could hold the division up was of vital importance. His IV. Army was now in full retreat from Deraa towards Damascus. He no doubt hoped that if those 20,000 fugitives could get a little rest at Damascus, he could organize a defence of that place against our purely cavalry force. It was imperative that they should not get that rest and chance to reorganise. The Divisional Commander therefore decided on an immediate general attack. The 5th L.H. Brigade were to cross the river to the south of Yakub bridge at El Min and work round the enemy's flank, while the 3rd Brigade were to engage the enemy in front, and if possible get round his right flank by crossing immediately south of Lake Huleh. The 9th L.H. Regiment moved and engaged the enemy between the lake and the bridge, pinning him to his ground and forcing him to disclose his dispositions and strength. The Notts battery early in the fight silenced the enemy guns, obtaining a direct hit upon one of them, and effectively kept down the fire of enemy machine guns which had been located by the 9th L.H. Regiment. The 3rd M.G.S. took up positions along the western bank from which effective covering fire could be given to troops crossing the river. Vigorous reconnaissances under heavy rifle and machine gun fire for a crossing of the river was carried out by the 10th L.H. Regiment, and a ford was located half a mile south of the southern end of the lake. 8th L.H. Regiment were sent to join the 9th Regiment, the plan being for the 8th and 9th Regiments 3rd Machine Gun Squadron and Notts Battery, R.H.A. to give covering fire while 10th L.H. Regiment crossed. After this Regiment had established itself on the eastern bank the remainder of the Brigade would cross. It was expected that the operation would be facilitated by the fact that the 5th L.H. Brigade at 1630 were reported to be crossing the river at El Min without opposition and would therefore soon make themselves felt on the enemy's flank. It turned out, however, that the country to the east of the 5th Brigade crossing place was so rough that they were unable to get on to the main road until after daylight next morning. Up to 1700 the enemy hung on to his positions with determination, at times developing considerable rifle and machine gun fire, causing us a few casualties. By 1730 all covering troops were in position and the 10th L.H. Regiment moved forward to cross at the ford previously located, under heavy covering fire from the remainder of the Brigade. The water was about 2'6" in depth. The 10th L.H. Regiment were all across by 1915 and were followed at once by the 8th L.H. Regiment. These two Regiments were directed to make for Deir Es Saras, the 10th L.H. Regiment detaching B squadron to move south along the river to clear up any enemy still in position. This squadron encountered a party of enemy in the dark who opened fire at a few yards range causing casualties. Without hesitation the leading troop under Lieut. M.H. Macnee flung themselves off their horses - it was too rough to charge mounted - and with fixed bayonets rushed the flashes. A sharp fight took place and for a time the enemy fought with great determination inflicting several casualties on us. The balance of the squadron soon supported the leading troop and the enemy surrendered. The post included 12 Germans, 41 Turks, 1 field gun and one machine gun, and one motor lorry. During these operations it was apparent that the enemy were extensively using motor lorries as a means of withdrawing the troops, comprising their rear guard on this sector. In the morning a large number of these had been seen moving down to the river positions. Similar tactics were two days later adopted by them at Sasa.