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[Page 33]
enemy intended to attack there early next morning, and accordingly Major Hamlin was instructed to remain at the Amman Road and connect up with the 9th Regiment.
The 8th Regiment (Major Shannon, D.S.O.), less one squadron, and plus one squadron of the 10th Regiment, was placed under the orders of the 2nd Brigade and held a line Kh El Fokan, (J21), through point J.15d.8.2., and along the ridge of high ground running north to J9d88. A force of the enemy advanced to within 800 yards of this position and remained hidden in dead ground and high grass all day. At dawn the following morning, 3rd May, the enemy advanced to the attack. During the night he had crept up close in the long grass. The attack was launched against the whole front of the 8th Regt. A squadron of the 5th Regiment rendered valuable assistance with cross fire from the right. The enemy attacking the right squadron were driven back into the dead ground. The firing died away about 0630 and Major Walker, who was in charge of the left squadron of the 8th Regiment reported that the enemy were then lying in dead ground within 30 yards of his position. Two machine guns were placed in such a position that they enfiladed the ground in front of the squadron, and it was owing to this that the enemy could not retire, they having passed inside the zone of fire during the darkness. A troop was then sent round their flank. When this troop appeared in the enemy's rear, the whole of them surrendered - 319 in all, including several Germans and a battalion Commander. A further enemy force was then observed advancing along the same route as that taken by the first and halted in the dead ground abovementioned. They were still in this position when we withdrew at dusk under orders for the general retirement. During the action two guns of the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery rendered valuable assistance.
On the morning, 3rd May, the Turks made a determined attack on two of our posts on the Kefr Huda ridge. The post near Kefr Huda was attacked by fifty or sixty Turkish infantry well supplied with grenades. Our post consisted of 2/Lieut. Masson, one sergeant, one corporal and 12 other ranks. The Turks got to within 15 yards of the post before the post retired. By that time 2/Lieut. Masson had been wounded, his corporal and 1 other killed, and 5 wounded (including his sergeant), and the Hotchkiss rifle destroyed by bombs. The survivors of the post retired to an adjoining post. The Turks then endeavoured to advance along the ridge, but were held up. Shortly afterwards, from 200 to 300 Turkish infantry were seen in the captured position. The question of counter-attacking to recover the lost post was considered, but was postponed until a decision had been arrived at as to whether the general outpost line should not be shortened, and thereby strengthened. A fresh column of 3000 enemy infantry had now arrived from the west of Kefr Huda and further bodies of Turkish troops could be seen moving west, along the Amman road. The extended outpost line as then held, had been quite safe for the first 2 days that it was in position. The tactical situation was, however, now altering owing to the large enemy reinforcements which had arived and were further likely to arrive. The Brigade had no troops in hand to support the front line if a break occurred. I accordingly recommended to the Divisional Commander that our front line fall back on to the line held by the infantry when they occupied Es Salt in March last. This would shorten the Brigade line by half and bring our line back 2,000 yards south of Kefr Huda. Kefr Huda did not appear to me of any special tactical importance. The enemy could not bring wheeled artillery into that locality. As an observation post it was of no use to observe the Shunet Nimrin road. The Divisional Commander approved of my suggestion and orders were issued by me for the necessary withdrawal. Before same, however, could be effected, orders were issued for the retirement of the whole of the force at Es Salt.
The infantry that had attacked the Shunet Nimrin position from the valley had not made much headway and the Turks refused to attempt to evacuate their strong position. The force sent down the Shunet Nimrin road from Es Salt by the 5th Mounted Brigade did not put any appreciable pressure on the rear of the enemy infantry position. The enemy infantry at Shunet Nimrin refused to surrender or run. On the other hand, the enemy forces around Es Salt were becoming hourly stronger. There was only 1 mountain track, (No. 13), still open for the retirement of several mounted Brigades. The track itself was threatened. If the enemy could push the 4th Brigade another mile down the valley, or push the 1st Brigade off the ridge,