the new reinforcements. He seemed quite cheerful and confidant but I could not help thinking it was a very strange way to regard your duty towards your country as secondary to worrying Kitchener for the right number of men to carry the expedition through. I had handed in my memorandum on the situation to Maxwell on coming on board and of course neither Hamilton or Braithwaite had seen it up to this time. It subsequently became the mainspring of all my troubles in the Staff in the future because after reading it they realised three things which they can never forgive. Firstly that I had a perfectly clear conception of the extent of our so called success up todate. Secondly that I knew too much and disapproved of the strategy of the cmpaign and thirdly they saw for the first time that I was not prepared to be an offical eyewitness but was determined to remain and independent critic who could not be got at in any one's interests.
Whilst I was with Sir Ian and the Chief of Staff a message ame in to say that several wagon loads of copper a had been reported at Dedegatch on their way through to Turkey. Sir Ian turned round to Braithwaite and said 'We must try and stop them at all costs. Could not our military attache in Sofia do something. But Braithwaite said 'He is no use and an idiot'. Sir Ian then said it must be a job for some of our independent bright boys' out there will you send a cable and see vwhat can be done. Braithwaite then left the room a but I stayed some time longer and talked om many subjects. They asked me to cable that same evening to London for some Turkish maps I had bought from the General Staff when in Constantiniple. This I said I would do. Sir Ian complained bitterly that the Government had not published his dispatches. He loves writing and would