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the true facts about anything connected with the Dardanelles.
To quote Mr. Churchill again, after the shadows began to fall in the early part of March:
'It was therefore decided that the gradual advance must be replaced by more vigorous measures. Admiral Garden was invited to press hard for a decision, and not to be deterred by the inevitable loss. . . . . These Admiralty telegrams were the result of close consultations between the First Sea Lord and myself, and, like every other order of importance which has emanated from the Admiralty during my tenure of office, in peace or war, bear the written authority of the First Sea Lord. I wish to make that point quite clear. I may extend it, and say there is no important act of policy, no scheme of Fleet distribution, or of movements of ships, or of plans of war, which has been acted on during my tenure at the Admiralty, in which the First Sea Lord has not concurred in writing.'
From this passage in his speech it would appear that Lord Fisher had given his full written approval to the 'gingering-up process' which was now taking place and which led to the attack on March 18th, were it not qualified by a further passage a little later:
'I am not going to embark on any reproaches this afternoon, but I must say I did not receive from the First Sea Lord either the clear guidance before the event, or the firm support afterwards which I was entitled to expect. If he did not approve of the operation he should have spoken out at the 'War Council.'
The two passages can hardly be reconciled. In fact, the more we examine Mr. Churchill's a speech and compare it with the Prime Minister's, and then consider Lord Fisher's subsequent resignation, we only become the more deeply involved in the fog of obscurity and uncertainty which shrouds all these events.
But the most remarkable misunderstanding of all is over the